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Office of Training Response to the  
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CIA TRAINING PROGRAM

August 1960

I. GENERAL REACTIONS.

I feel that this very comprehensive survey of CIA training policies and practices is both timely and useful. Many of the points that it raises are not new. The fact that they are raised again provides us an opportunity to re-examine them. Before commenting on the recommendations made in the Survey, I should like to make four, general observations affecting our Agency training program as a whole. While each of these appears also in the Survey, I believe that they deserve greater emphasis.

A. Agency Training--"Permissive" or "Planned"?

Basic to planning, programing, and staffing our Agency training program are answers by command and management to this question: "Who shall be trained in what knowledge or skills, when, and for what purpose?"

Our present and not inconsiderable array of training--formal OTR courses, component-conducted instruction, on-the-job training, and external training--represents an energetic response to specific training requirements. But at the same time, as the Inspector General points out, enrollments in some courses have been irregular and courses have had to be canceled or suspended for lack of sufficient numbers of students.

There are apparent differences of opinion as to the need for various levels of training. For example, some of our new professionals (JOT's) receive intensive and comprehensive basic training before going into on-the-job training; others (junior economists for ORR) receive only a short orientation but not basic intelligence training to

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complement the substantive knowledge acquired in college and elsewhere. As a further example, the Inspector General strongly recommends the establishment of a mid-career training program, and OTR has had such a course on the drawing board; nevertheless, there has been no stated requirement for this level and type of training from the Deputy Directorates.

The Agency attitude toward participation in training also varies. While individual career services have set training standards related to positions, for the most part training has been permissive rather than planned or directed. To repeat, there are exceptions, but the net result is an uneven approach to training. The "five per cent in training" rule succeeded in bringing about a greater participation in training, to be sure, but even so, performance was uneven.

Lacking enforced or enforceable training standards, the individual supervisor determines what training shall be accomplished. A branch chief who is training-minded, with or without a five per cent rule, will make a strenuous effort to see that his personnel receive the maximum training. But another branch chief may take the position that the best--or the only--way to learn is by doing. A proof of the inadequacy of the present system of permissive training policy is the sorry spectacle of instructors and training liaison officers having to drum up candidates for courses which have been established in response to a Deputy Director's request.

For a planned or directed training policy, what should be our overall objectives? How much training do we need and how much can we afford, not only in terms of dollars but also of time? How can we make a planned system work? I am not sure that we or any other agency can arrive at the Answer, but I think we can make a start. And whatever we arrive at now, there must be continuing review of present and future requirements and of our methods for meeting them.

Our Answer to the problem of training must be tied in with our career service and career development policies and programs. It seems safe to assume that today's demands call for the development of generalists who have a comprehensive

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knowledge and understanding of Intelligence and Operations and are capable of directing and coordinating programs of broad scope, and experts who can deal with detailed complexities and meet high professional standards in very specialized fields. And many of our generalists will also possess some specialized skills.

Next, we will no doubt continue to make allowance for limited, lateral entries of experts into our Agency at various levels, but we should look to our JOT Program as the primary source of new, young professionals. There will continue to be a variety of opportunities for career advancement of both generalists and specialists, and for movement between "ladders of advancement" in order to fill the need for various combinations of skills--including general executive talents at the higher levels.

I suggest that we approach the problem of planned or directed training in three ways:

1. First, professionals should be assigned to general training courses at specified points during their careers--orientation and basic training, mid-career training, and senior officer training.
2. Second, professionals should be assigned to language, area, and functional training courses on the basis of the training prerequisites for positions to which they are assigned.
3. Third, professionals should be encouraged to continue their own personal intellectual interests and self-development with or without Agency sponsorship or assistance, as the individual case warrants.

I believe that such an approach is practicable with basically our present training structure. Where more drastic action is required, however, is in the establishment of training standards and prerequisites for specific positions--or tasks--and in the appointment, where this is not now the case, of responsible

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senior professionals as component or unit training officers. We can expect no improvement in our Agency training program so long as training is permissive.

**B. The Junior Officer Training Concept**

Our task is made simpler if we can reach agreement on a concept of orientation and basic training for our new, junior professionals.

I agree with the Inspector General in the concept of a single service in CIA--that is, in the self-identification of the professional as a CIA Intelligence Officer, whether he is assigned to the DD/P, DD/I, or DD/S as a generalist or as a specialist. And I believe that all new, junior professionals should be gotten off to the same start in their Agency careers in terms of their initial orientation, indoctrination, and familiarization with the business of Intelligence and CIA missions and functions.

On the other hand, I believe that we must stick to our present, proven JOTP concepts and practices and admit to the essential differences between JOT's and those other highly desirable young people who are employed because of their peculiar, specialized qualifications. We need both, and we need flexibility to attract, recruit, hire, and to train both for the variety of tasks to be performed.

To deal with this problem, and at the same time to protect the vital asset which our JOTP represents, we have formed a special task force comprised of the following officers:

OTR

Matthew Baird



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SSA-DD/S

O/Personnel

Emmett Echols



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DD/P

DD/I



This group will meet until the problem is resolved.

**C. Rotational Assignments to OTR**

I would like now to turn to the problem of the quality of OTR-conducted training and to the problem of selection and placement of JOT's. To deal with both of these, the Inspector General has recommended the establishment of certain new boards and panels comprised of representatives of the Deputy Directorates. While undoubtedly these could serve a useful purpose, I really do not believe that these measures are as necessary or as potentially effective as the rotational assignment of selected, experienced officers from the Deputy Directorates to OTR in regularly established positions as instructors, staff officers, and as training officers on the JOT Program Staff.

On the basis of long experience I have become convinced that a key factor in the development of more efficient instructors in the growing complexity of Agency skills and techniques is the rotational assignment of instructors. By this I mean a continuing exchange of personnel between OTR and the Components, particularly the Clandestine Services. Through such exchange, planned on a career development basis for the individuals concerned, and with individuals selected on the basis of qualifications, the Component officer brings to OTR his experience and expertise in his particular field and applies these to a related area of instruction. The OTR instructor, meanwhile, is brought up to date on current operating practices in his field and enriches his background experience for his next tour as a career instructor.

The matter of current, operational doctrine also is affected by the rotational assignment. No matter how much our system for obtaining operating doctrine is improved, its translation into realistic training doctrine and effective instruction is made more positive if the instructor is personally experienced in the type of activity involved.

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Similarly, communication between OTR and the Components is facilitated and OTR plans and programs are made more realistic if some of OTR's staff positions are filled by officers on rotational tours from the Components. The case of the JOTP staff is particularly important.

Training officers assigned to the JOTP Staff work under the close and continuing supervision of the Chief, JOTP who has long experience in this position. The training officer comes to know intimately the JOT's assigned him. He has access to their complete background files, he interviews them as applicants, recommends their acceptance or rejection. He briefs and counsels them after entry on duty, is their advisor during the training period, follows their progress through the courses of instruction, observes their attitudes and aptitudes, and recommends the direction their careers should take. He keeps in very close touch with career service panels, divisions, and branches; recommends and assists in placement; and briefs both JOT and new supervisor when the JOT enters on-the-job training in the Component. If this training officer is representative of his Component, if he has the confidence of his Component and is carefully selected for this responsible assignment, he is in an ideal position to select candidates of the kind needed by his Component and to guide them effectively during their initial, critical training period. He can be far more effective than a panel dealing with files and reports.

The importance of this concept of exchange of personnel to the effective conduct of OTR's training responsibilities cannot be emphasized enough; it is OTR's life blood. On the one hand, it is the assurance of continuity and currency; on the other, it is the essential ingredient to the development of a career corps of experienced instructors and managers and planners of Agency training activities. Although this concept has appeared to be accepted and to be working successfully, I am deeply alarmed at the growing evidence that it will not continue to the extent that it must if we are to have an improved training program.

#### D. The Role of the Director of Training

Finally, I should like to make a brief comment on the role of the Director of Training. As Director of Training, I am

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responsible directly to the Deputy Director (Support), and in this capacity I and my Office are immediately responsive to training requirements laid down by any office or Deputy Directorate of this Agency. I can, however, under existing regulations and in my present command relationship, perform an additional function, if I am called upon to do so. I can serve as the Director's staff officer for training. And in this capacity I can and want very much to lend whatever advice, guidance, and suggestion my knowledge and experience afford to the serious problems of planning and improving our Agency Training Program.

As I stated in my opening remarks, there is little in this Survey that is new to me and to OTR. But so long as the Director of Training serves only as Director of the Office of Training and not also as the Agency's staff officer for training, there is little he can do toward implementing the measures which seem vital to the significant improvement and further development of our Agency Training Program.

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## **II. COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.**

The following comments are submitted on the cited, specific recommendations made in the Inspector General's Survey.

1. The Directors of Personnel and Training together with representatives from operating components take a fresh look at the overall problem of clerical usage and make recommendations for a more effective system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the clerical training program.

Recommend concurrence. The Chiefs, Intelligence School, and Assessment and Evaluation Staff, OTR have been designated to participate in such a review and assessment. Clerical personnel should be sufficiently trained before they are released to duty assignments.

2. DTR adopt for headquarters administrative and career planning purposes a designation of  that adequately reflects the scope and purpose of this intelligence training center.

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3. DTR adopt a three-year tour of duty as standard practice for instructors and schedule replacement at the rate of one-third of the instructor staff annually. (Primarily OS/TR)

Recommend concurrence, with allowance for individual exceptions as to length of tour of duty. The length of the individual tour is not as important as assurance of a planned, staggered turnover.

4. DTR redesignate his Overseas Training Staff to better reflect its expanding function as a clearing house for training

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doctrine; that its role as a depository and an editorial and coordination staff be negotiated with the Directorates and publicized, including preparation and dissemination of bibliographies under the various security limitations that may apply.

I recommend that the Overseas Training Branch be redesignated as the Operations Training Support Branch with a primary responsibility for training support and guidance to overseas, operational training activities, including [redacted] and a secondary function for provision of specialized, training materials support to other Operations School branches [redacted]. It is agreed that we must ensure appropriate awareness in the Clandestine Services of the existence of useful training materials, but it would be well not to overstate the present capabilities of this Branch. The Branch is functioning very effectively and producing at top capacity. Only by enlarging its T/O and by assigning additional, qualified personnel capable of a high standard of individual work can its functions and scope be expanded. At the same time, actions have been and are being taken to ensure that operating branches of the Clandestine Services are fully cognizant of the nature and scope of services available.

5. Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection, collaborate with Chief, Operations School/OTR, to develop and publicize a working collection of open intelligence literature [redacted] which will fully reflect the existence and capabilities of the principal collection at headquarters.

In line with this recommendation, it is planned that arrangements be made to develop a rotating selection of open intelligence literature in the OCR branch library in the Recreation and Services Building (R&S), from which, in turn, selected items would be loaned to [redacted].

6. DTR experiment with the concept of a board of overseers composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to

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improved communication with and indoctrination of consumers, and to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum and enrollment.

While I am willing to experiment, I really do not believe this recommended action is necessary. I have qualified, senior officers, representing the consumers, on my staff, including my Deputy; Chief, Operations School; and Chief, Plans and Policy Staff--all DD/P career service designees. Further, through frequent liaison meetings, and through the expanded use of such media as the OTR Bulletin, OTR maintains close communication with the consumers.

7. The DD/P establish in his office a position of DD/P Training and Doctrine Officer having responsibility and authority for the formulation and implementation of Clandestine Service training policy and the development of operational doctrine.

While this is not my responsibility, I strongly recommend concurrence. Further, this officer should be supported by qualified, senior operations or intelligence officers designated as training officers in the several operating divisions and staffs.

8. DD/P take appropriate steps to ensure that DTR be made a participant, through the presence of his representative or through other effective form of consultation, in all long-range planning for the employment or expansion of deep-cover operations.

Recommend concurrence.

9. The DTR confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g., International Communism, could be handled by OTR for the reservists.

Recommend concurrence; Chief, Plans and Policy Staff, OTR has been designated to meet with a committee of representatives of DD/P, DD/I, DD/S, and C/MMPD to discuss various aspects of OTR support of the Agency Military Reserve Training Program.

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10. The courses on International Communism be given wider publicity and offered to the personnel of other agencies.

I believe that this action may not be necessary. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of a memorandum from the Director of Training to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 26 May 1956, subject: Establishment of School of International Communism, selected members of the SIC instructional staff already carry a heavy schedule of training for personnel of other Government agencies. Over half of the training accomplished by SIC is non-CIA staff. They participate regularly in courses at the Foreign Service Institute, Strategic Intelligence School, Naval Intelligence School, the Air University, and others. Any appreciable, additional workload will necessitate an expansion of the SIC staff.

11. The DD/P instruct all supervisors to observe, in requesting language training, the principle that training in regular classes is the normal and most effective method, and that resort to tutorial training shall be had only in exceptional cases and where required by security considerations, unavoidable pressure of time, or other valid reason.

Recommend concurrence.

12. DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be amended by adding new provisions (a) directing the Deputy Directors to identify the categories of employees for whom specified degrees of language proficiency are required and to tie these standards of proficiency into promotion practices, and (b) directing the Deputy Directors to identify those positions, or that proportion of positions, in each overseas station that may be filled only by individuals who possess, to the degree specified, the language commonly used in the general area of that station.

Recommend concurrence.

13. DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be further amended to make language proficiency testing, according

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to Agency standards, mandatory for all employees who are required to have language skill.

Recommend concurrence.

14. DD/P direct that in all long-range operational planning the implications with respect to possible radical change in requirements as to the nature or extent of language capabilities be carefully considered and that the conclusions reached be regularly and promptly communicated to the DTR.

Recommend concurrence.

15. DD/P give clearer recognition to the necessity for developing in larger numbers than at the present rate linguistically qualified area specialists.

Recommend concurrence.

16. The Deputy Directors take such measures as may be necessary to cause all staff employees under their jurisdiction who claim language competence to submit to the Office of Training tests at the earliest practicable moment.

Recommend concurrence.

17. DD/P consider the advisability of placing directly on the division chiefs the responsibility for all scheduling of language training for personnel in the division and for monitoring the timely carrying out of the language training thus scheduled.

Recommend concurrence, with possible exception of certain JOT's.

18. The DD/P, as well as the DD/I and DD/S, strongly recommend to their division chiefs, assistant directors and other senior officers that they familiarize themselves, through attendance therat, with the contents of the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course.

While I am in complete sympathy with this recommendation, I feel it may be somewhat difficult to carry

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out. As the Inspector General has stated, two groups of senior Clandestine Services officers already have attended this course and judged it useful and valuable. We believe this particular course is most useful and pertinent to officers who have had some Agency experience. Similar material related to specific areas is contained in the Americans Abroad Orientations. We are looking into the utility of adapting lessons from the behavioral sciences into our tradecraft training and also are considering the problem of overseas effectiveness training for deep cover, U. S. personnel.

19. The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP.

While I agree with what I interpret to be the training and indoctrination intent of this recommendation, I believe that for the foreseeable future we should continue to employ JOT's and junior specialists through separate procedures. I do strongly recommend, however, that they be trained together in the orientation and familiarization courses, and in such other courses in which their needs are compatible.

20. The DTR establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates together with appropriate representation from the Office of Personnel and Training. The Chief/JOTP should chair the panel.

On the basis of the favorable evaluations received of results of our present arrangement and system, I believe that this recommended action is not necessary. It might also prove unwieldy in practice, and serve to slow down rather than to facilitate the timely processing of candidates. I strongly prefer to have selected, experienced representatives of the DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S serve rotational tours of duty as training officers on the JOTP staff.

21. The DTR should give consideration to the feasibility of the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection process recommended above.

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I do not believe that such a panel would really serve a useful purpose in this regard. May I suggest, however, that selected university consultants do serve this purpose, not sitting as a panel to judge individual applicants, but rather providing their viewpoint to broad problems of spotting, selection, recruitment, means of attracting desirable candidates, and so forth.

22. The DTR arrange for the participation on a rotational basis of line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates in JOTP placement panels.

I believe that Deputy Directorate representation on the JOTP staff, on a rotational basis, can better serve this purpose.

23. The DTR together with the Director of Personnel take steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to assign second class status to DD/S and DD/I careers.

I will, of course, continue to look into this matter with the Director of Personnel, and together with him will undertake whatever steps are necessary to keep such prejudice from occurring. It is a long established policy that the JOT's be given a clear and accurate picture of the Agency's mission and functions and of the mutual, interdependence of its parts. But JOT's will form their own preferences regardless of any action we can take, and most have a natural preference for service overseas.

24. The DD/P establish minimum standards of training and experience for case officer apprenticeship including general preparatory, basic skills, language and advanced operational training, and that he determine the feasibility by experiment of some form of overseas familiarization as a part of the apprentice period.

Recommend concurrence. We shall be glad to assist.

25. The DTR together with the Director of Personnel undertake to monitor the present efforts of the Department of State to improve personnel management and training in the Foreign Service for measures that may be adopted for the Agency's benefit.

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We have been doing this for some time, on a continuing basis.

26. The DD/I direct that the recruitment and initial training of junior analysts be accomplished through the JOTP; that increased emphasis be placed by the Agency's recruitment facility on the recruitment of JOT's with academic backgrounds suited to DD/I needs; that ORR and other specialists recruitment be phased down as production of JOT's increases and generally limited to senior analysts at the Ph.D. level.

Recommend concurrence, except that for the foreseeable future junior analysts who do not qualify as JOT's continue to be hired or selected against DD/I slots, but be trained initially through the JOTP.

27. The DD/I and the DD/P initiate a test program for the rotation of qualified DD/I professionals to the DD/P to serve as reports officers with part of the tour to be spent overseas, DD/P reports officers in turn to rotate to the DD/I for training and experience in the evaluation and use of intelligence reporting. (A similar recommendation was made in the IG's survey of the Far East Division, DD/P, dated June 1958. The lack of recognizable progress in this important effort impels us to repeat the recommendation here.)

Recommend concurrence, with the hope that this will not interfere with rotation of OTR instructors to the DD/P, or DD/I.

28. Advanced external training for analysts be phased somewhat later in the career pattern, perhaps after the fifth year of duty, to permit maximum play of JOTP and other intelligence preparation during the apprenticeship period.

Recommend concurrence.

29. The DTR be specifically charged with the responsibility of determining under whose auspices non-OTR training will be conducted and pertinent Agency regulations be amended accordingly.

Recommend concurrence.

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30. DTR review the training records of employees in professional categories who resigned from the Agency during FY 1960, or longer if necessary, to determine if a more definitive policy governing external training is required.

**Recommend concurrence.**

31. The DCI authorize the establishment of senior grade positions for selected Training Officers at the Assistant Director or DD/P Division Chief level with job qualifications designed to ensure the effective performance of proper training functions.

**Strongly recommend concurrence.**

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32. The DTR initiate an amendment to   which more clearly describes his responsibility to render only advice, guidance and support to the on-the-job training effort.

**Recommend concurrence.**

33. The DD/P study the extent to which it is feasible to develop a greater capability in technical tradescraft in operations officers, establish minimum standards of technical training as basic to the required preparation of all operations officers and issue policy accordingly for the guidance of the Technical School, TSD.

**No comment.**

34. The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship of Agency functions.

OTR has done some preliminary research and planning for such a course and, in fact, already offers some training in separate, functional courses at this level, such as management and overseas effectiveness training. I have been most reluctant to push this course, however, while training is still approached on a permissive basis. I will

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be happy to move ahead with our planning if this course will be part of a directed training program.

35. The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be established to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described in the IG survey.

I, too, favor a senior officer training program, but not a "CIA Senior Officer Course" comparable to that offered at the National War College. First of all, such an undertaking cannot help but be very expensive to administer and to operate, and OTR is not now "staffed up to it." I must note, too, that OTR currently is making very extensive use of the valuable services and time of many of our senior and top-level CIA officials as guest speakers and panelists in existing courses. Finally, we are already accomplishing a considerable amount of training of CIA senior officers at this level in

a. the senior officer colleges of Defense and State,

b. civilian and military graduate schools of management,

c. advanced studies in other subject matter in colleges and universities in the United States and overseas (especially by DD/I officers), and last

d. our own, existing senior officer-level courses.

I feel that we can do more in this area, and am confident that we can work out together a comprehensive program which will meet the general needs of senior executives as well as the peculiar needs of our senior professional specialists.

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### III. COMMENTS ON THE TEXT OF THE SURVEY, AND ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

#### A. Scope of the Present (Training) Program

1. In paragraph II, B, 2 on page 5, the Survey states that the "DD/I...has preferred to hire individuals previously trained and requiring no extensive further investment on the part of the Agency." I believe that while these individuals may be very well qualified in subject-matter fields, in most cases they will not have had previous intelligence training or experience. As a minimum they will require orientation to intelligence and to CIA, and basic training in intelligence techniques specifically related to DD/I.

2. In the same paragraph, the Survey goes on to say that the "DD/P...has had to look...to its own resources for advanced training of journeymen case officers in advanced areas of operations." This is only partly true. DD/P does conduct on-the-job training, special seminars, and, of course, TSD training. But in direct response to DD/P requests, OTR has provided for some time a wide variety of advanced, specialized courses and is prepared to develop new courses, when and if required, within its capabilities. I am more concerned over the irregular attendance of advanced, specialized courses established at DD/P request.

3. In paragraph II, C, 7 on page 9, the Survey looks forward to the "development of more efficient instructors and instructional techniques." I believe that a large part of this problem can be effectively resolved by ensuring adequate rotation and exchange assignments of instructor personnel, where this is appropriate. In addition, we are already engaged in a reasonably extensive instructor training program available to all Agency training activities. As part of a continuing program, all instructors receive instruction in Conference Techniques from [redacted]. Further, the OTR Educational Specialist has, since July 1959, trained over 100 OTR and other CIA component training instructors in Instructional Techniques. Supplementary measures introduced or carried forward by him include:

- a. training of an assistant Educational Specialist;
- b. development of workshops in instructional techniques;

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c. activation of an OTR Educational Committee for exchange across-the-board of training experience and development of new concepts, techniques, and materials;

d. revision or refinement of operating procedures, production of training aids, guidebooks, handbooks, and brochures.

Finally, a member of the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, OTR, is keeping in touch with developments of "teaching machines," and research is being conducted [redacted] under contract, in the application of teaching machines and programed instruction to language teaching.

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## **B. Office of Training**

### **1. Organization.**

a. In paragraph III, A, 6 on page 12, the Survey states that from 1953... "...forward there has been a proliferation of courses adapted to special needs, but no further expansion into major new departments of instruction." Although I may have misinterpreted this statement, it literally is not so. The new courses in area training, communism, paramilitary training for the CIA Contingency Force, covert action and labor operations, and others reflect a continuing growth in new or more clearly defined areas of instruction. This growth is not in every instance reflected by a new, administrative department or change in OTR organization. Our present OTR organization has been flexible enough to admit new courses or revisions in present courses into our system of Schools, each divided into functional or subject matter branches or faculties. The courses conducted by these faculties fall into a clear pattern of course families or groupings.

b. With reference to III, A, 7 on pages 12 and 13, I should like to add that the present organization of OTR, as devised by OTR and endorsed by the Inspector General and the Management Staff, also includes the Junior Officer Training Program as a separate "school" or line function. Further, effective 8 April 1960, [redacted] was redesignated also as a "school," with its [redacted] made responsible

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directly to the Director of Training. Headquarters staff guidance and support on training and administrative support matters are provided by the Chief, Operations School, and Executive Officer, OTR, respectively.

c. I should like to make a minor correction in fact in paragraph III, A, 8, a, on page 13. Although audio-surveillance technically is a TSD area of responsibility, the Audio-Surveillance Management Course was developed by OTR and the FI Staff of DD/P primarily as an operational course in the planning, organization, and management of a/s operations. TED provides only the technical instruction required in this course.

## 2. The Intelligence School

a. Although I find no large bone to pick with the Inspector General over his discussion of the Intelligence School's activities, I cannot help but feel that he has gained an impression of this School which does not reflect sharply enough its objectives and activities. There are many small inaccuracies; I will seek to point out only a few.

b. Actually, at the time of this Survey, there were six faculties comprising the Intelligence School. The Survey omitted the one-man "faculty" of the OTR Orientation and Briefing Officer, currently Mr. [redacted] with office and auditorium in Central Building. Further, courses offered by the Intelligence Production faculty meet professional needs of DD/P and DD/S as well as of DD/I. And the Intelligence Production Course for JOT's has been increased from 12 to 14 weeks in length, to permit the inclusion of additional scientific and other intelligence studies.

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c. In paragraph III, B, 2 on page 17, I feel that the following statement is somewhat exaggerated, or perhaps too inclusive a generalization: "...In areas of employee orientation, management skills and intelligence production, however, there has been limited consensus as to what was to be done and the OTR effort has been subject to constant

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adjustment." In the areas mentioned there has been a constant effort made to update materials and to keep the courses immediately responsive to training needs. The content of OTR management courses compares favorably with that of approved AMA and college-level instruction.

d. With reference to paragraph III, B, 3 on page 6, Office of Communications employees are not exempted from Agency orientation. By cooperative arrangement, they are briefed and oriented as separate groups. In my opinion, the Office of Communications has adopted an exemplary attitude toward orientation and briefing, and in this connection it has been made mandatory for OC personnel, and their dependents whenever feasible, to attend the Americans Abroad (AAC) area orientations and the CIA Dependents' Briefings.

e. With reference to paragraph III, B, 5, on page 19, I feel that the Inspector General's remarks concerning written communications warrant a full recommendation that this subject be given immediate, active study. The problem of communication very definitely affects OTR, and we are attempting vigorously to exploit the potential of such existing publications as the OTR Bulletin and Support Bulletin, and will assist in any way we can the proposed, DD/P letter to the field.

f. I agree with the general tenor of the Survey's commentary on training in management and supervision. Whether we have management training or not depends of course on the customers' will, and whether management training is tied in with individual career development or with specific positions is itself a decision for management. Thanks, however, to aggressive DD/S participation in both external and internal management training, and thanks also to our recent, useful experience with the Senior Seminar in Management led by [redacted] I believe OTR has developed sufficient experience in this field of training to be able now to recommend a pattern of management training suitable to this Agency's current needs.

g. To return to a less critical area, with reference now to paragraphs III, B, 8 and 9 on pages 20 and 21, Intelligence

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School courses in effective speaking, effective writing, and conference techniques are not purely remedial in character. They are, as the Survey goes on to put it, courses which instruct all performers, strong or weak, in preferred techniques. Those performers who are found weak are given special attention. Similarly, Intelligence Production faculty intelligence courses are not aimed at the marginal performer. They are aimed at the bulk of DD/I professionals, virtually all of whom need training in the skills and techniques covered by the courses. This training would still be needed even if the DD/I would "agree to recruitment of the bulk of his junior officer requirement through a truly Agency-wide JOT system...."

h. On page 23 of the Survey, in paragraph III, B, 11 there is another minor error, probably arising from misunderstanding of information provided during the survey. Clerical applicants do not receive a "personality" test, only a short employment test on vocabulary, arithmetic, and clerical accuracy.

### 3. Operations School

a. As in the case of the Intelligence School, there are a number of misunderstandings or errors of fact; most of these are not of major significance but I wish to note some of them very briefly.

b. First, paragraph III, C, 1, b, reads as follows. "The Headquarters Training Staff is responsible for training in clandestine operations. The JOT, for example, after graduation from basic intelligence training, will receive further specialized training in operations from this staff...." This is not quite accurate. The Headquarters Training branch provides advanced and specialized training in clandestine operations. (Basic and familiarization training in clandestine operations, and still other advanced and specialized courses are [redacted] The Headquarters Training branch also has contributed a two-week "Clandestine Services Orientation" block in the 10-week JOT Orientation Course. After completion of the latter course,

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the JOT [ ] for either the Operations Course or Operations Familiarization Course. Selected individuals, usually specialists, may take specialized courses thereafter, but most DD/P candidates proceed from the OC to on-the-job training in the area divisions of DD/P.

c. With reference to paragraphs III, C, 1, d and e, on pages 26 and 27, I must take exception to the assertion that OTR courses are of "excessive length" and subject to "in-flexible scheduling."

(1) The length and content of each operations course are based upon requirements presented to OTR by the Clandestine Services, and these courses are constantly reviewed and modified in accordance with DD/P special staff recommendations and with a view to improved instructional methods.

(2) The courses are of varying lengths--two, three, and four weeks, for the most part, and they are presented on either a full-time or part-time basis, according to agreement between OTR and the Clandestine Services. Student critiques very often reflect an opinion that the training time allowed is too brief!

(3) At the same time, OTR is limited in its scheduling procedures by such factors as numbers and qualifications of instructors, number and size of classrooms, availability of training aids and equipment, [ ]

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[ ] and, of course, dollars.

In general, the Operations School strongly prefers full-time training, with the student free from the daily distractions and responsibilities of his desk, and able to derive the utmost benefit from full concentration on the training course. But if part-time training is necessary and acceptable, in the light of other, current demands on employees' time, then the Operations School will bow to necessity. Further, the Operations School favors the use of seminars as a means of exchange

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the length of tour of OTR duty is not as important as the need for a planned, staggered turnover of instructor personnel. And when the tour is completed, OTR makes a strong effort to see to it that instructors receive fair and thorough consideration for subsequent duty assignments.

g. With reference now to para. III, C, 2, f, (4), on page 32, and the problems of training doctrine, it is the consensus in OTR that the greatest problem and deficiency is the lack of an established channel or system for movement of cases, projects, studies, and other DD/P materials useful to training, from any point [redacted]

[redacted] to OTR. What OTR needs most is selected "raw materials" of operational doctrine or ~~experience~~ which can be refined into training doctrine and training materials suitable for classroom, field exercise, or covert training use.

h. As noted in the Inspector General's discussion in paragraph III, C, 2, f, (5), the Overseas Training Branch has come to play a central role in the Operations School for exploitation and processing of operational, training materials. Without overtaxing this Branch's capabilities or impairing its performance of its primary function, I intend to make sure that our standard operating procedures permit the fullest possible utilization of materials and doctrine available, consistent with proper need-to-know and compartmentation.

i. To return to the problem of sources of doctrine, I feel that OTR should look to the screening and processing, evaluation and sterilization of project files and case histories, etc. as more properly a function of the DD/P special staffs. Particularly in the more advanced areas of operational training the case method is most applicable, for it is difficult if not impossible to confine or restrict operational methodology to out-and-dried school solutions which are the antithesis of ingenuity and flexibility in conceiving and mounting clandestine operations. At any rate, inasmuch as there is at present no OTR Training Doctrine Staff as such, the senior project officers and staff officers could work directly with the OTR School concerned in the selection and provision of training materials.

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j. Turning next to the present state of the training curriculum [redacted] (reference is made to paragraph III, C, 2, g), I believe that only in enrollment and only in certain courses has there been "marked instability." Changes have been made in scheduling on the basis of enrollments and of other, usually external, influences, and here I iterate my general protest against "permissive" training. Course content has been modified and improved. The Operations Course, for example, has been rescheduled, modified, and shortened somewhat to enable OTR--without increases in instructional staff or additional, physical plant--to meet the requirement to train approximately double the past number of JOT's per year and to include or to change the emphasis on certain subject matter as recommended or approved by the Clandestine Services. More specifically, for example, the time devoted in the

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[redacted]  
Course #10, now under way. OTR is receptive to recommendations from the CI and FI staffs concerning the extent of training in investigative techniques and interrogation in this course. Finally, we are trying to shorten training time wherever improved instructional methods and techniques make this possible.

k. I have but one brief observation to make concerning the text on covert training, and this is in reference to paragraph III, C, 3, f, (1), on page 47. Covert Training is currently receiving improved "feedback" on the post-training performance of the individual trainee, upon elicitation from the case officer. Although we appreciate the requirements of compartmentation and operational security, we do have a peculiar need-to-know and the situation can stand further improvement.

#### 4. School of International Communism

I have already commented on the recommendation concerning this School, and wish to note only in addition that, in collaboration with the Language and Area School, the SIC also presents a course entitled Basic Country Survey - USSR, of interest to both DD/P and DD/I personnel.

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## **5. Language and Area School**

a. The Language and Area School, in my opinion, is particularly well covered in the Survey, and, in general, I am in full agreement with the text.

b. With respect to paragraph III, E, 2, e, on page 58, it has been noted that full-time language training, which is intensive, has the advantage of being the fast means of acquiring a desired level of proficiency. In contrast, part-time training should be thought of also as long-term language training. It can provide the same proficiency, but takes longer. It also involves less pressure on the student.

c. With regard to the Overseas Effectiveness course--and specifically paragraph III, F, 7, b--I, too, regret the necessity to suspend this training. It is an expensive course to run, however, and without a confirmed enrollment it becomes an expensive risk. It has a high potential for mid-career employees, and it could become a part of a possible mid-career course.

## **6. Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP)**

a. I am very pleased to note that the Survey has cited the JOTP "concept of selection depth..." (in paragraph III, F, 1, a, on page 76), and I urge that this concept be maintained central to our long-range planning for JOT's.

b. Both OTR and the Office of Personnel are conscious of the geographical patterns of the JOT student body, and we have compared our recruitment procedures with those of the Department of State. The make-up of a typical JOT class probably reflects the fact that our Agency recruiters are concentrated more on the eastern portions of the country where there are more sources and where there has been found a greater return for the time, effort, and money expended. Nevertheless, the college degrees and advanced studies accomplished by JOT's reflect attendance at some 165 different colleges and universities throughout the United States and abroad. Our present aim is to select from

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candidates from as many parts of the country as possible, including Hawaii. The final selection, however, should be made on the basis of quality and qualification, not school or geographic area of origin.

c. With regard to JOT graduates authorized for 1960 forward, the DD/I has advised the Chief, JOTP informally that 10 of the 25 authorized for the DD/I will be recruited directly, leaving only 15 to be brought in in 1960 through the JOTP. It is hoped that these 10 also will be afforded intelligence training, however.

d. The overall performance in JOT recruiting for 1960 is considered to be generally satisfactory, but we have not reached our reduced goal of 113. (We will probably hit 103-104.) The "production" by the university consultants has been disappointing. They need not only to be expanded in number and geographic location but also stimulated to greater action!

e. We also have tried to isolate factors affecting "declines" in recruitment. In some cases the recruiters do not have time to brief the candidates thoroughly; hence, many come here to explore. In other instances, recruitment comes so late that clearance cannot be obtained before they have taken other jobs. The cost of moving household effects for married young men is sometimes prohibitive. Our beginning salaries are attractive enough but we need the "HHE" allowance to enable the married candidates to afford the move to Washington. These and other factors are under urgent study and action will be initiated as quickly as possible.

f. OTR and the Office of Personnel are keeping close watch on Foreign Service personnel policies and practices with a view to adopting any of their measures which are particularly successful and which are applicable to our own needs. We shall continue to do so, not only with respect to personnel procurement but also to training and career planning.

g. With respect to paragraph III, F, 3, a, (2) on page 82, the "public advertized, competitive entrance test" plan

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has been tried, in collaboration with NEA. It was not successful or useful. On the other hand, CIA is receiving increased publicity, and there is no apparent impediment to application for employment. In this connection, one of the university consultants mentioned a year ago his concern over the problem of attracting bright, high-type young Americans to Government service in general, not only to CIA. We might pursue this thought, perhaps with HEW, with a view to producing an attractive brochure on careers in the Federal service, for circulation through placement and employment staffs and key educators in the universities and colleges throughout the United States. It might be supplemented by a personal letter--from the President?--to heads of these institutions and of their departments of Government, Public Administration, etc.

h. With reference to paragraph III, F, 3, a, (3) on page 83, I have already acknowledged a possible imbalance of patterns of recruitment--albeit our patterns of recruitment reflect good reason and economy--, but our ranks are open to all areas. If we can usefully expand geographically our university consultant coverage, and reasonably increase our publicity within the limitations of good security, and if we clearly base our final selections on quality, the political implications of whom we select should be minimal. I believe we must rely on the basic integrity of the CIA officer as the demonstrable counter to any allegations of misplaced or undue loyalty and influence based upon the "old school tie" or regional affiliations and prejudices.

i. Concerning paragraph III, F, 3, a, (4) and (5) on pages 83 and 84, I have already commented on the proposed panels to supplement or augment the present JOTP screening and selection procedures, and I have urged instead the positioning of selected officers from DD/P, DD/S, and DD/I on the JOTP staff on a rotational basis. The active, intimate participation of these officers in an already proven, successful system should further enhance and improve upon JOTP staff performance to date. And in this connection I do not believe that we have tended to "overemphasize intellectual qualities and to underemphasize rugged and adventurous

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traits." On the contrary! For example, [redacted]

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[redacted] OTR asked for a show of interest in volunteering for membership in the CIA Contingency Task Force and a prerequisite, three-month paramilitary training course, nearly half of the JOT students in Operations Course #9 responded, and this in the face of the obvious, low priority assigned to PM activity in general. The JOTP seeks to obtain well-rounded young people, neither musclebound nor narrow intellectuals, and it is pretty well established that the burly right tackle is not necessarily the best paramilitary case officer.

j. There has been considerable discussion of the present system of "Agency sponsorship of JOT military duty" (see page 84 of the Survey). While this arrangement is not a major factor in JOT procurement, it is a useful device, especially in times of emergency. And it was hard to come by! I believe that this practice should be continued.

k. With respect to "intelligence training for specialists" (page 85), as I have already remarked, I believe that orientation and some basic intelligence training are useful and desirable for all new junior professional personnel.

l. With reference to paragraph III, F, 3, d, (3) on page 86, it is hard to visualize how any highly-motivated, adventuresome, young American, interested in overseas service, would not be attracted to a DD/P career! I do not see this as a problem of combating prejudices but rather as a problem of proper placement according to background and demonstrated aptitudes and capabilities. JOT training emphasizes the importance and interdependence of the three Deputy Directorates as integral parts of this Agency's functioning within the Government. And we are emphasizing that directed assignments can and will be made in the Agency's interest, at EOD if necessary.

m. The next paragraph (4) on page 87 also warrants a brief comment. I agree, of course, with the cited "answer," but I do not feel that the JOTP is "overly isolated" from the Deputy Directorates. Individual training officers of the JOTP maintain very close and continuing contacts with career

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panels and operating officials. They have to, to be effective at all in selection, screening, and placement, and in carrying out their particular responsibilities for training, career guidance and development.

n. With respect to paragraph III, F, 3, e, beginning on page 87, I can only agree that the problem of JOT attrition deserves further study and that it involves especially the career management and development of the junior officer after he leaves the JOTP.

#### 7. Other Agency Training

I have no detailed comments to make here concerning other Agency training, other than to note my satisfaction with the cordial and very cooperative relationships existing between OTR and the Office of Communications and the Technical Services Division. The division of effort, coordination, and communication between us appears to be practicable and effective. With respect to the [ ] Project, I do not feel it appropriate for me to comment at this time.

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#### 8. The Future of Training in the Agency

In my opening comments on the Survey I expressed some general reactions and suggestions on the future of Agency training. Obviously, I am in full agreement and sympathy with many of the views of the Inspector General. Other points which he raises I believe warrant further discussion and study, and I look forward to the opportunity to review these with him and with the Deputy Directorates.

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